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Codifying Torts Conflicts: The 1999 German Legislation in
Comparative Perspective
MathiasReimann"

While American

conflicts law consists overwhelmingly

of cases,

continental Europe has a long and proud tradition of codifying private

international law.1 Particularly in the last two decades, Europe has witnessed
a wave of national codifications and international conventions in this area.
But at the turn of our century, the process of European conflicts codification
is far from complete. While some areas, notably contracts, are broadly

covered,2 others, such as corporations, are still in flux.
Tort conflicts lie somewhere in the middle. While there is still no
general European convention in force addressing them,3 they have been

codified in most but not all individual countries.

But the last two years

have brought considerable progress: Germany finally joined the countries
with codified tort conflicts rules, and an international working group drafted
a European Convention on the law applicable to non-contractual
obligations.

I will look at the modem codification of tort conflicts rules in the
national, European, and transatlantic contexts. The innermost of these three
concentric circles is the 1999 German legislation; its characteristic features

are interesting enough in their own right for American conflicts scholars (I).
These features are then considered in their European environment; here, we

see that the new German law accords with a growing regional consensus
about the basics of tort conflicts (II). Finally, we will look at written tort
conflicts rules in the United States and Canada; the similarities with the
European texts indicate an international
transboundary tort cases (III).

trend

in the

resolution

of

Copyright 2000, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
Professor of Law, University of Michigan; Dr. iur., UniversitAt Freiburg, 1982; LL.M.
University ofMichigan, 1983. Thanks to Dorothee Janzen, LL.M., University of Michigan, 2000, for
research assistance and many valuable comments.
1. There are some exceptions from this rule on both sides of the Atlantic. Unsurprisingly, the
major exception from the American caselaw approach is Louisiana with its tradition of civil law style
codification, see La. Civ. Code arts. 3515-3549, as amended by 1991 La. Acts No. 923. But
surprisingly, the major exception from the European legislative approach is not England but France.
England has recently enacted statutory choice-of-law rules on contracts and torts, see Contracts
(Applicable Law) Actof 1990 (in force 1991), and Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions)
Act of 1995, so that it now has more statutory conflicts provisions than does France where caselaw
prevails.
2. The.Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome Convention) of
1980, 1980 O.J. (L 266), is in force. throughout the European Union. Virtually all non-EU countries
have statutory rules on contract conflicts as well.
3. But see infra Part lI.B.I.
*
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I. THE GERMAN CODIFICATION OF 1999: CHARAcTERISTIC FEATURES

A. Closing the Gap
Germany's choice-of-law rules are contained in the Introductory Act to the
Civil Code (BGB). 4 Originally enacted together with the Code in 1896, they were
completely overhauled in 1986.' Yet, the rules in the reformed Act of 1986 were
still fragmentary. They covered general issues (such as renvoi and public policy),
persons, the form of legal transactions, family law, succession, and contracts, but6
they remained virtually silent on non-contractual obligations (such as torts),
property, agency, and corporations. In these areas, the government found
insufficient consensus and thus left them to caselaw and scholarship for the time
being.
In the long run, such incompleteness is difficult to tolerate in a legal culture
committed to comprehensive codification. Nonetheless, the project to cover the
remaining areas languished for almost a decade. Suddenly in 1998, the federal
cabinet presented a draft to the legislature which passed it within a few months. All
this happened virtually without discussion or public attention.' The provisions
entered into force on June 1, 1999.s
The new legislation fills two important gaps in the German private international
law statute. First, it adds choice-of-law rules governing non-contractual obligations.
This category comprises not only torts (article 40) but also unjust enrichment
(article 38) and management of another's affairs (article 39). Second, the
legislation contains new rules on property (articles 43-46). Provisions on agency
and on corporations are still lacking.
The overall approach is a moderately conservative blend of territorialism and
the closest connection principle. On the one hand, the rules use mainly territorial
criteria. With regard to non-contractual obligations, they point first and foremost
to the law ofthe state in which the crucial acts and effects took place (articles 38 (2)

4. Einfbhrungsgesetz zum Btrgerlichen Gesetzbuch (EGBGB) of Aug. 18, 1896,
Reichsgesetzblatt I,604.
5. Gesetz tiber das internationale Privatrecht of July 25, 1986, Bundesgesetzblatt 1,1142. In
practice, the choice-of-law rules, contained in the second chapter of the Act, are used like a separate
statute, i.e. independently from the rest of the Act and from the Civil Code.
6. The only exceptions were former article 38, see infra note 30 and accompanying text, and a
1942 statute of very limited scope, see infra note 18.
7. The legislative process is described by Rolf Wagner, Zum Inkrafltreten des Gesetzes zum
InternationalenPrivatrechtfir auflervertragliche Schuldverhaltnisse undfirSachen, 1999 Praxis des
Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 210.
8. Gesetz zum Intemationalen Privatrecht flr aulervertragliche Schuldverhfltnisse und for
Sachen of May 21, 1999, Bundesgesetzblatt I, 1026. The official statement of the government's
legislative intent isthe BegrOndung (reasons) attached to theGesetzesentwurf der Bundesregierung, 624
Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, 14. Wahlperiode (1999), Drucksache 14/343, at 6-21
(hereafter cited as Drucksache). Foran overview, see Peter Hay, From Rule Orientationto "Approach "
in German Conflicts Law, The Effect of the 1986 and 1999 Codifications, 47 Am. J. Comp. L. 653,
637-46 (1999).
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and (3), 39 (1), 40 (1)); for property rights, they select primarily the law of the situs
(articles 43 (1)).9 On the other hand, the choice made by territorial criteria can be
overridden if the case has a significantly closer connection with another state
(articles 41, 46).
From an American perspective, some parts of the new German legislation are
more interesting than others. The rules pertaining to unjust enrichment and
management ofanother's affairs are of limited practical importance; they are also
difficult to grasp for a common law lawyer who is not familiar with the dogmatic
structure of the respective substantive areas of civil law. And the provisions
governing property are so straightforward and so similar to their common law
counterparts that they require little explication. Clearly the most intriguing aspects
of the new German legislation are the provisions pertaining to tort conflicts.
B.

Choosing Tort Law

The new German rules on tort conflicts are concise and general. 0 They consist
of only three articles and apply to all tort cases. The government deliberately chose
to limit them to the basic provisions and thus to forego special treatment of
particular categories of torts (such as products liability, defamation, unfair
competition, or mass accidents)," trusting that the general rules will prove flexible
enough to accommodate the specific concerns arising in these areas.
There is no special provision about local rules of safety and conduct either.
Yet, neither German courts nor scholars have ever seriously doubted that injudging
the defendant's conduct, the law of the place where it occurred must be taken into
account.' 2 The legislature did not intend to change this rule but simply saw no need
to spell it out.' 3 It will thus continue to apply.
The order of the three articles on torts is peculiar and potentially confusing, at
least to a civilian reader. Article 40 applies specifically to torts (only) while
subsequent articles 41 and 42 apply generally to (all) non-contractual obligations
(including torts). In other words, the statute proceeds from the narrower to the

9. Inboth areas, there are several exceptions. Where unjust enrichment claims concern the
restitution ofperformance made to fulfill an underlying obligation, the law governing this obligation
prevails (Art. 38 (1)). Where the management ofanother's affairs consisted of paying a debt, the law
governing the debt applies (Art. 39 (2)). Inproperty conflicts, the most important exception pertains
to means oftransportation: toavoid achange oflaw with everyborder crossing, rights in aircraft, ships,
and railroad vehicles are governed by the law ofthe state of origin (Art. 45). As to the exceptions in
tort conflicts, see infra section 1.4.
10.

See Appendix, New German Tort Conflicts Rules, infra.

11. See Drucksache, supra note 8,at 7-8, 10-11. This also meant that they did not incorporate
the rules of the Hague Conventions on Products Liability and on Traffic Accidents, see infra section
II.B.2., which Germany has not ratified.
12'. Judgment ofthe Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) (hereafter cited in the German
style as BGHZ volume/page) of January 23, 1996. 1996 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (hereafter
cited in the German style as NJW year/page) RR 732; see also Gerhard Kegel, Internationales
Privatrecht 552 (7th ed. 1995).
13. Drucksache, supranote 8,at 11.

1300

LOUISIANA LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 60

broader provisions. This not only violates the traditional civil law canon that
general rules precede specific ones, it is also inconsistent with the rest of the
German conflicts statute where this canon is observed. The drafters of the new
rules should have maintained the traditional order, both for the sake of internal
consistency and in order to facilitate the analysis.
At their core, the new tort conflicts provisions consist of a ground rule which
is subject to potential overrides on three levels. Thus it is important that the basic
rule and exceptions be applied in the right order. In addition, there are special
provisions limiting damages and favoring direct actions against insurers.
1. The GroundRule: Lex Loci with a Pro-PlaintiffTack

The basic rule is laid down in article 40 (1): tort claims are governed by the
law of the state where the defendant acted. If the harm occurred in that state as
well, as would normally be the case, the choice is clear and the result is the same as
under the traditional American rule pointing to the place of the harm.' 4
If conduct and harm occur in different countries, however, German law adds
a peculiar pro-recovery twist: it leaves the choice between the respective laws to
the plaintiff! This "principle of favorable law" (Giinstigkeitsprinzip) is not a
novelty introduced by the recent legislation"5 but had long been established in
German caselaw and scholarship.' 6 In fact, article 40 (1) now restricts it in an
important regard. Hitherto, the plaintiff could freely choose, and if he failed to do
so, the court had to apply the more favorable rules ex officio. This forced the judge
(at least theoretically) to research and evaluate the claim under both laws. Now, the
court is liberated from that burden. If the plaintiff wants to opt for the law of the
place of the harm, he must do so at an early stage of the procedure. If he
does, the chosen law governs. If the plaintiff fails to use this option in timely
manner, the law of place of conduct applies by default. In either case, the court
proceeds under one law only. Thus it is now the plaintiff (or his attorney) who must
research and evaluate both laws if he wants to benefit from the more favorable
regime.' 7
2. Override I: The Common Home State Exception

From these essentially territorial ground rules, article 40 (2) makes a major
exception: ifplaintiff and defendant have their habitual residence in the same state,
14. See Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws § 377 (1934).
15. Nor is it an idiosyncrasy of German law; it exists in other countries as well, see infra note 52
and accompanying text.
16. It is normally justified as an effort to help injured parties to obtain compensation, see Karl
Firsching & Bemd von Hoffmann, Intemationales Privatrecht 431 (5th ed. 1997) (supplying other
reasons as well).
17. See Drucksache, supra note 8, at I. For further procedural details and implications for legal

practitioners, see Stephan Lorenz, ZivilprozessualeKonsequenzenderNeuregelungdeslnternationalen

Deliktsrechis: Erste Hinweisefr die anwaltlichePraxis, NJW 1999, 215.
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the law of that state takes precedence. This exception is, again, not new.'8 Article
40 (2) codifies, and to some extent clarifies, long established caselaw.' 9 Where it
applies, the parties' common home state law displaces the law of the place of the
wrong. This result is mandatory, leaving the plaintiff no unilateral choice.
As in the United States, this departure from the lex loci delicti is particularly
important in single car accidents in which both parties come from one state but have
an accident in another.2" Yet in contrast to the common domicile rule so popular
in American courts, the German provision refers not to (technical) domiciles but,
like most German choice-of-law rules, to the places where the parties normally
live. 2' Note also that it does not require a pre-existing relationship between the
parties but applies between strangers as well.
The main reason for the German rule is not that the common home state has the
only interest in the parties. It is rather that the parties come from the same
environment and that this shapes their situations and expectations. It seems
preferable to treat them according to the rules of the state in which both will have
to live with the consequences of the wrong rather than to subject them to the law of
the place of the accident which may be fortuitous and unrelated to the rest oftheir
lives.22
3. OverrideII. The CloserConnection EscapeClause
The specific tort rules choosing the lex loci or the common home state law are
subject to the general override in article 41 which applies to all non-contractual
obligations: if there is a "significantly closer connection" with the law of yet
another state, then that state's law trumps. This escape clause resembles its
counterpart in the contracts section (article 28 (5)).
The main reason for which the provision will be invoked is given by way of
example in the first clause of article 41 (2): "there may be a preexisting relationship
18.

It has its roots in a 1942 Nazi statute providing for the application of German law to torts

between German citizens committed abroad, Verordnung (ber die Rechtsanwendungbei Schdigungen
deutscher Staatsangehdriger aulerhalb des Reichsgebietes of Dec. 7, 1942, Reichsgesetzblatt 1,706.
Oddly enough, the statute had remained in force until 1999.
19. For an overview, see Firsching & von Hoffmann, supra note 16, at 436-39.
20. The German Federal Supreme Court's (Bundesgerichtshofs) struggle with an evolvingvariety
offactpatterns involving common and split nationalities and domiciles isreminiscent ofthe New York
Court ofAppeals' travails in the 1960s and i970s. The leading German cases are: judgment ofNov.
23, 1971, BGHZ 57,268;judgment ofOct. 5,1976, NJW 1977,496;judgment ofMar. 8, 1983, BGHZ
87, 95; judgment ofMar. 13,1984, BGHZ 90, 295;judgment ofJan. 8,1985, BGHZ 93,214;judgment
ofJuly4, 1989, BGHZ 108,200; and judgment ofJuly 7,1992, BGHZ 119, 137. The best-known New
York decisions are: Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963); Dym v. Gordon, 209 N.E.2d
792 (N.Y. 1965); Macey v. Rozbicki, 221 N.E.2d 380 (N.Y. 1966); Tooker v. Lopez, 249 N.E.2d 394
(N.Y. 1969); and Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972).
21.

For corporations, associations, or other legal persons, the principal place of business, or,

where abranch office is involved, the location of that office, counts, Art. 40 (2)2nd clause.
22. See Drucksache, supranote 8,at 12;judgment ofthe German Federal Supreme Court ofOct.
5, 1976, 1977 NJW 496, at 497; judgment of Mar. 8, 1983, BGHZ 87, 95, at 100; judgment ofJan. 8,
1985, BGHZ 93,214, at 216-18;judgment ofJuly 7, 1992, BGHZ 119, 137, at 141-42.
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between the parties which links them overwhelmingly to the law of a third state."
In many cases, plaintiff and defendant are partners in contract, husband and wife,
or members ofthe same group. Ifthe tort occurs in such a context, article 41 allows
the court to extend the law governing the relationship to the tort claim as well.'
The judge can thus avoid having two different laws govern the same act (e.g., a
breach ofcontract also constituting a tort) which could lead to inconsistencies. The
preexisting relationship does not have to be a legal one; a close factual connection
between the parties, such as traveling with the same tour group, can suffice as
well.2"
Absent such a legal or factual relationship between the parties, it is difficult to
imagine a case which has a significantly closer connection with a state other than
that of conduct, injury, or common habitual residence. Perhaps, however, article
41 may prove useful to accommodate concerns arising in special areas of tort law,
e.g., in the context ofproducts liability (involving manufacturers, consumers, and
intermediaries) or defamation cases (involving authors, publishers, readers, and
victims).
4. OverrideIII: Choice ofLaw by the Parties

Last, but not least, all these rules and exceptions are subject to article 42, which
allows the parties to choose the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation.
Again, this provision essentially codifies the prevailing view in caselaw and
clarifies
scholarship."5 It also answers two previously debated questions. First, .it

that the choice can be made only after the occurrence of the liability triggering
event; this is mainly to protect the injured party from giving up rights before the
fact. 6 Second, article 42 does not limit the parties' choice to laws related to the
event; thus, as in contract law (article 27),27 the parties can in principle choose any
law they want. Of course, the agreement itselfmust be valid, i.e., not result from
overreaching or fraud, and it cannot affect the rights ofthird parties, such as fellow
victims, co-defendants or insurers (article 42 2d clause).
Express expostfacto agreements will be rare but article 42 allows implied ones
as well.2" The crucial question then is what constitutes an implied choice. In the
past, German courts have been rather quick to find tacit agreements. Most
importantly, suing and defending in German court without raising the choice23. See Drucksache, supra note 8, at 13. In German law, this is known as "akzessorische
Anknolpfung" (accessory choice).
24. See the example given by Firsching & von Hoffmann, supranote 16, at 440.
25. See id.at 441. For a more detailed overview and furtherreferences, see Bemd von Hoffmann,
in J. von Staudinger, Kommentar zum Bolrgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Einfclhrungsgesetz und
Nebengesetzen marginal notes 149-51 to article 38 EGBGB (13th ed. 1998).
26. Drucksache, supranote 8,at 14. Some scholars argue that the drafters ofthe new statute left

open the question whether achoice could also be made ex ante. See von Hoffmann, inStaudinger,
supra note 25, marginal note 146 to Art. 38 EGBGB.
27. Some restrictions apply with regard to mandatory norms (Art. 27 (3)) and for the protection
ofconsumers (Art. 29) and employees (Art. 30).
28. See Drucksache, supra note 8,at 14.
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of-law issue was considered tantamount to a mutual choice of German law,
even though it was far from clear that the parties had ever thought about the
issue."' Of course, this is an easy way for a court to justify the application
of the lexfori. It is likely that this practice will continue under the new rules as
well.
5. The Order ofAnalysis: Applying the Statute in Retrograde
Since the lex loci groundrule can be overridden by three exceptions, each

trumping the previous one, applying articles 40 through 42 in their numerical order
is inefficient and potentially frustrating. Every time one has determined the result

under an earlier rule, one must check it against the later one and may very well find
it changed. This can easily happen several times in a row. It is better to begin at
the end and proceed backwards, i.e., to ask the relevant questions in the following

order:
I.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Have the parties determined the applicable law by an agreement
valid under article 42? If the answer is yes, their choice governs,
making further analysis unnecessary.
Does the case have a connection with a state that is significantly
stronger than the connection with the place of the wrong or harm
or the parties' common habitual residence? Ifso, that state's law
applies without further ado.
Do the parties habitually reside in the same state? Ifthey do, that
state's law controls (article 41), regardless of the place of the
wrong.
Did the wrongful act and injury occur in different states, and has
the plaintiffchosen the law ofthe injury state in a timely manner?
If so, the chosen law applies (article 40 (1) 2d cl.).
Where did the wrongful act occur? (article 40 (1)).

Once the applicable law has been determined under this five-step analysis, it might
still be rejected under the general public policy clause (article 6). It is also subject
to two further qualifications listed in article 40 (3) and (4).
6. Damages: Public Policy Limitations
If foreign law applies, article 40 (3) limits the damages available under it.
Damage limitations have a history in German private international law. Until 1999,
former article 38 prohibited the courts from awarding greater damages against a
German citizen than were allowed under German law. This relic of a more
nationalist past had long been under attack because it created an unwarranted
privilege for German defendants, discriminated against outsiders, and violated

29. Judgment of the German Federal Supreme Court ofMar. 3, 1981, published in 1982 Praxis
des internationalen Privat- und Prozeflrechts 13-14, and in NJW 1981, 1606.
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European Union law. " Its abolition had been long overdue and eliminated an
embarrassing feature of the German conflicts regime.
Under the new rules, damages available under foreign law are limited in three
ways. First, they must not be significantly higher than necessary to compensate the
victim. This prevents, inter alia, excessive damage awards for pain and suffering
or other intangible harm as are sometimes awarded by courts in the United States.
Second, damages are excluded where they obviously serve purposes other than
compensation. Thus, a German court applying American law will not award
punitive or treble damages because their purpose is, at least in part, to deter
wrongdoers and to reward victims for bringing them tojustice.3 Third, the damage
not contradict the rules of an international convention in force in
award must
32
Germany.

Article 40 (3) is essentially a special public policy clause. Its language
("significantly higher," "obviously serving other purposes") indicates that it is not

concerned with minor differences between damages under foreign and domestic
law. Its limitations apply only where awards under foreign law clearly exceed
German standards.33
7. DirectAction againstInsurers: BroadPermission
If the damage limitation favors defendants, article 40 (4) helps plaintiffs: by
making available direct actions against the wrongdoer's insurance on two
alternative grounds. They are permitted to proceed directly against the insurer not
only when allowed by the law governing the tort but also if provided by the law
applicable to the contract between the tortfeasor and the carrier. This dual approach
is more permissive than the previous majority opinion among courts and scholars. 4
It also expresses the general German policy in favor of direct actions against
automobile liability insurers3" and, more generally, the important role of insurance
in German tort law.
8. Addendum: BewareofRenvoi!
In applying the new German rules, one must beware that, as a general matter,
article 4 (1) of the German private international law statute provides for renvoi.
30. See Firsching & von Hoffmann, supra note 16, at 449-50.
31. See judgment of the Federal Supreme Court of June 4, 1992, BGHZ 118, 312, 334-45
(refusing to recognize the punitive damage award in an American tort judgment).
32. Since Article 3(2) already establishes the supremacy of conflicts rules in international
conventions ratified by Germany, Article 40 (3)3 would seem to become relevant only with regard to
conventions ratified by Germany but not by the country the law of which applies under the general
choice-of-law rules, see Drucksache, supra note 8,at 12-13.
33. See Drucksache, supra note 8,at 12. The best outline ofwhat istolerable isprovided by the
judgment ofthe Federal Supreme Court ofJune 4, 1992, supra note 31.
34. See Firsching & von Hoffmann, supra note 16, at 442.
35. They are generally allowed under § 3 of the Gesetz fiber die Pflichtversicherung far KFZHalter of Apr. 5, 1965 (PflVG), Bundesgesetzblatt 1,213.

2000)

MA THIAS REIMANN

1305

Since the new tort rules make no exception, it follows that in torts cases, a reference
to foreign law includes conflicts rules as well, which may in turn point back at
6
Germany or to a third country. A major exception is choice of law by party
agreement (article 42); under article 4 (2), such agreements pertain exclusively to
substantive law.
II. THE EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT: AN EMERGING REGIONAL CONSENSUS

Like most areas ofprivate law today, rules on non-contractual liability must be
understood and analyzed in the European context. This is true not only of
substantive law,37 it is at least equally important in the choice-of-law area. In

European tort conflicts, we can observe the gradual emergence ofa common basic

pattern in the last two decades. This pattern is visible both in the modem national
codifications and in several international conventions.
A. NationalLegislation: Modern Developments
During the last quarter century, almost a dozen European countries codified
39
3
their choice-of-law regimes. " Some, like Germany, just overhauled older laws.
40
Most, however, enacted completely new statutes (including Austria,
36. See Drucksache, supra note 8, at 8. This conclusion is supported by two further
considerations. First, the majority ofGerman courts and scholars have traditionally allowed renvoi in
torts conflicts, see Firsching & von Hoffmann, supra note 16, at 450-51. Second, where the statute
wants to exclude renvoi it says so, as in the contract rules (Art. 35 (1), Art. 3 (1) 2d clause).
37. There are considerable efforts to harmonize substantive tort law in Europe. For the time
being, most of these efforts take place on theacademic level. Several groups of scholars pursue the idea
of a European tort law in avariety of forms, among them the Tilburg Group, see Jaap Spier & Olav
Haazen, The European Group on Tort Law ("Tilburg Group ") and the EuropeanPrinciplesof Tort
Law, 1999 Zeitschrift fMr europlisches Privatrecht 469; and the Trento Project, see Mauro Bussani &
Ugo Mattei, The Common Core Approach to European Private Law, 3 Colum. J. Eur. L. 339, 353
(1998). Yet,the most impressive scholarly accomplishment is Christian von Bar, Gemein-Europaisches
Deliktsrecht (2 vols. 1996-98). Probably the most important practical result is the harmonization of
European products liability under the Council Directive 85/374 of July 25, 1985 on the approximation
of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for
defective products, 29 O.J. (L 210)(Aug. 7, 1985).
38. The conflicts statutes of Germany, Greece, Italy, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Switzerland, Spain, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Turkey, and Hungary are reprinted in the original
language with German translations in Wolfgang Riering (ed.), IPR-Gesetze in Europa (1997). For an
earlier overview, reflecting the situation twenty years ago, see C.J.G. Moore Choice ofLaw in Tort:
A Comparative Study, 32 Am. J.Comp. L. 51 (1984). The article also provides English translations
of the tort conflict rules of several European countries though many of these provisions since been
superseded.
39. See supra note 8 and text accompanying (hereafter cited as Germany). For an overview and
English translation of the 1986 statute, see Rainer Gildeggen & Jochen Langkeit, The Conflict ofLaws
Code Provisions ofthe FederalRepublic ofGermany: IntroductoryComment and Translation,17 Ga.
J. Int'l & Comp. L. 229 (1986).
40. Bundesgesetz vom 15. Juni 1978 lber das internationale Privatrecht (hereafter cited as
Austria). For an introduction and translation, see E. Palmer, The Austrian Codification ofConflict of
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Switzerland, 4' Italy,42 Liechtenstein,43 and several Eastern European countries.44 )
The Netherlands has prepared a draft.45 Even England has joined the statutory
bandwagon.' While these countries have substantially modernized their choice-oflaw rules, there was no upheaval comparable to the American conflicts revolution.
Instead, European legislators mostly agreed on a blend oftraditional territorialism,
the closest connection principle, and party autonomy.'
1. The Persistenceof Territorialism

As in the new German law, the application ofthe lex locidelicti is still the basic
rule in virtually all European countries. In this regard, tradition has been amazingly
persistent. Yet, the various regimes differ in two respects.
First,most codifications make lex loci the ground rule but a few treat it as the
residual choice. The former, like the German EGBGB, list the territorial rule first
and then specify various exceptions and modifications. 4" The latter, like the Swiss
statute, begin with more specific provisions and if they do not apply, resort to the
law ofthe place ofthe wrong.49 This difference will rarely affect outcomes since
in both instances lex loci is the general choice for all cases not covered by a more
particular rule.
Laws, 28 Am. J. Comp. L. 197 (1980).

41. Bundesgesetz Ober das Internationale Privatrecht vom 18. Dezember 1987 (hereafter cited
as Switzerland). For an overview and translation, see Symeon Symeonides, The New Swiss Conflicts
Codification, 37 Am. J.Comp. L. 187 (1989).
42. Legge 31 maggio 1995, n.218, Riforma del sistema italiano di diritto intemazionale privato
(hereafter cited as Italy). For an overview and translation, see Alberto Monateri & Vincent Narcisi,
Conflict of Laws in Italy (1997). For an extensive commentary, see Fausto Pocas, Commentario del
Nuovo Oiritto Privato Internationale (1996).
43. Gesetz vom 19. September 1996 iber das Internationale Privatrecht (hereafter cited as
Liechtenstein), reprinted in 1997 Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 364-69.
44. Estonia: Law on the General Principles ofthe Civil Code ofJune 28, 1994 (hereafter cited
as Estonia); Hungary: 1979.6vi 12.t6rv6nyereju rendelet a nemzetkdzi maganjogrol, reprinted in
Riering, supra note 38, at 364-409 (hereafter cited as Hungary); Romania: Legea nr. 105 din 22
septembrie 1992 cu privire la reglementarea raporturilor de drept international privat, reprinted in
Riering, supra note 38, at 132-209 (hereafter cited as Romania).
45. Schets van een Algemene Wet betreffende het Internationaal Privatrecht, reprinted in
Weekblad voor Privaatrecht, Notariaat &Registratie 605-11 (1993) (hereafter cited as Netherlands).
46. Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 (hereafter cited as England).
47. They disagreed, however, on whether to enact particular rules applying to specific kinds of
torts. Most recent statutes provide for special treatment of particular categories of wrongs though they
still differ on whether this is true for products liability, unfair competition, or yet something else. A few
modem, and most older, European choice-of-law regimes limit themselves to general provisions. Some
countries have also adopted special provisions by ratifying one or both of the Hague Conventions on
tort conflicts, see infra section l.B.
48. Austria §48 (1); Estonia §§ 164-165; Hungary § 32, Italy Art. 62; Liechtenstein Art. 52 (1);
England Sections 11-12. This is also true in several other countries with older statutes, such as Poland,
Prawo prywatne micdzynarodowe 1965, reprintedin Riering, supra note 38, at 94-131 (hereafter cited
as Poland) Art. 31, and Portugal, Codigo civil portugues, livro I. Parte general, reprinted in Riering,
supra note 38, at 108-31 (hereafter cited as Portugal) Art. 45.
49. See Switzerland Art. 133, Netherlands Arts. 92-96.
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Second, countries disagree on the relevant place if the wrongful act and the
harm occur in different jurisdictions. Most, like Austria or Liechtenstein, look to
the place of the act.' Others, such as Switzerland or the Netherlands, select the
location ofthe injury. 1 Still others, Germany and Italy among them, let the plaintiff
pick. 2 This difference will affect outcomes if the two states' laws differ in
substance. Thus the shared commitment to territorialism does not in and of itself
guarantee uniformity ofresults.
2. The Rise ofthe Closest ConnectionPrinciple

The principle of applying the law ofthe state with the closest connection has
become increasingly prominent in many parts of the world5 3 and, particularly in
contract cases, has dominated for some time.' More recently, it has made major
inroads in tort conflicts as well. Almost all modem European codifications displace
the law of the accident state if the case has more significant ties to another
country. 5 Sometimes, as in Austria, the connection principle openly dominates the
whole approach, generally selecting the state with the most significant contacts
(which may still be the accident state).56 Most often, however, it simply forms the
57
exceptions to the lex loci delicti rule, as the German example illustrates.
In the various special provisions, the closest connection appears in all forms,
shapes and sizes: as a flexible presumption or as a hard and fast rule, as an abstract
principle or as a concrete fact pattern (common nationality, domicile, or habitual
residence, pre-existing relationship, etc.), as a single exception or in several layers.
While these provisions are variations on the same theme, some make it easier than
others for a judge to justify a deviation from the lex loci rule.
3. The Issue ofPartyAutonomy

The overall picture is less clear when it comes to the question of whether
European conflicts legislation allows the parties to select their own law in
50. Austria § 48 (1) 1st cl.; Liechtenstein Art. 52 (1); see alsoEstonia § 164 (1).
51. Switzerland Art. 133 (2) (if place of injury foreseeable); Netherlands Art. 96; see also
England § 11 (2).
52. Germany Art. 40 (1); Italy Art. 62 (1)2d cl.; see also Estonia § 164 (3); in Hungary, the law
more favorable to the injured party applies, §32 (2).
53. See generally, Paul Lagarde, Le principede proximit dans le droit internationalpriv6
contemporain, 196 Recueil des cours 9 (1987).
54. See Mathias Reimann, Savigny 's Triumph? ChoiceofLaw in ContractsCases at the Close
ofthe Twentieth Century,39 Va. J.Int'l L. 571 (1999).
55. With regard tocommon domici'e cases, this has been duly noted by the scholar we honor with
this volume, see Symeon Symeonides et. al, Conflict of Laws: American, Comparative, International
275-76 (1998); see also Eugene F. Scoles et al., Conflict of Laws 770-72 (3d ed. 2000). Among the
modem statutory regimes, only Romania, Arts. 107-108, seems to stick firmly to lex loci. For France,
see infranote 95.
56. Austria §§ 1,48.
57.

See supra section I.B.2.
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transboundary tort disputes. About half of the modem conflicts statutes, like the

German one, expressly permit such a choice. 5 The others are silent on the issue,
probably because, in contrast to contracts, the question rarely arises in torts. Since
the standard treatises do not provide any help, it is impossible to tell without in-

depth research whether silence means permission or prohibition. Thus, all one can
say on the basis ofthe statutes themselves is that party agreements are either clearly
allowed or at least not forbidden.
B. InternationalConventions

European conflicts law is the realm not only ofnational codifications but also

of international conventions. They completely dominate the areas ofjurisdiction
andjudgments recognition," as well as contract conflicts.' In tort law, conventions

continue to play asomewhat smaller, thoughnonetheless significant, role. Here, we
need consider three documents. Though the first is still only a draft, it may well
become the most important torts convention since its scope is verybroad. The other
two have already become law in several European countries but cover only specific
kinds of wrongs.
1. The EuropeanDraftConvention on Tort Conflicts ("Rome II")
When the European Community countries decided to unify core areas of
choice-of-law in the 1970s, they originally envisaged and drafted a convention

covering both contractual and non-contractual obligations.6 ' Later, they restricted

their efforts to contract conflicts and eventually concluded the Rome Convention.62

The unification ofchoice oflaw innon-contractual obligations was postponed and
remained dormant for almost two decades. In 1998, it was finally resuscitated. The
European Council set up a working party toprepare a convention covering this area.
At the same time, the groupe europ~en de droit international priv6, an international
association of prominent scholars, completed a proposal for a Convention on the
Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations6" (informally called "Rome
58. See Germany Art. 42; Austria § 35 (1), (2); Liechtenstein Art. 39; Switzerland Art. 132
(choice limited to forum law), Netherlands Art. 92. Some ofthe older regimes allow such a choice as
well, see Poland Art. 25; Czech and Slovac Republic, Zakon o mezinariodnim pravu soukormem a
procesnim 1963, reprinted in Riering, supra note 38, at 298-337, Art. 9. For the new Italian statute,
see Pocas, supra note 42, at 311 (concerning party agreements).

59. Together, two conventions cover all of Western Europe, the Convention on Jurisdiction and
the Enforcement ofJudgments inCivil and Commercial Matters (1968) (Brussels Convention), and the
homonymous Convention of 1988 (Lugano Convention).
60. See supra note 3and accompanying text.
61. See Kurt Nadelmann, The EECDrafl ofaConventionon the Law Applicable to Contractual
and Non-ContractualObligations,21 Am. J.Comp. L.584 (1973) (with an English translation of the
text).
62. See supranote 2.
63. The original (French) text is reprinted in Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und
Verfahrensrechts 286 (1999). For an English translation, see Netherlands International Law Review 465
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II")." The draft was sent to the Secretariat General of the European Council for
consideration, and a European torts convention was, once again, underway.
Like the new German legislation, the proposal covers torts as well as other noncontractual obligations, especially unjust enrichment and managing the affairs of
another. It also contains various common rules applying to these categories.
The basic choice oflaw rules for torts are listed in Article 3. They begin with
the fundamental principle to select the law of the country which has the closest
connection (Article 3 Section 1). The closest connection is presumed to exist with
the parties' common country of residence (Section 2), or if there is no such country,
with the place ofthe.tort, provided that conduct and harm both occurred at the same
place (Section 3). An escape clause allows a court to override these presumptions
if the totality of circumstances establish a closer connection with another country
(Section 4); such an even closer connection is as particularly likely as the result of
a pre-existing or contemplated relationship between the parties (Section 5). Finally,
the parties can displace all these rules by an agreement about the applicable law
made after the event (Article 8).6"
While different in structure, these provisions are very similar to the new
German legislation in actual result. In essence, they select the place of the wrong
as the default choice 66 and then create several levels of more specific rules that
prevail if applicable: common residence is a closer connection and thus trumps the
place of the wrong; particular circumstances, such as a pre-existing relationship,
may create even closer ties with a third state, thus beating common residence;
finally, party choice trumps all.
The draft resembles the new German rules in other regards as well. It also
favors direct actions against insurers by allowing them, alternatively, under the laws
governing the tort or the insurance contract (Article 6). It requires that courts take
into account the rules of conduct and safety in force at the place of the harmful
event (Article 10).67 And it contains a standard public policy escape clause (Article
14).
Yet, there are also four particularly significant differences. First, the European
draft proffers a set of special provisions for some specific torts: with regard to
(1999).
64. See, e.g., Erik Jayme, Entwurfeines EU-Obereinkommensaber das aufau~fervertragliche
Schuldverhdiltnisse anwendbare Recht, Praxis des internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 298
(1999).
65. In contrast to the German rules, Article 8requires that the parties' choice be express.
66. Strictly speaking, Article 3 §3 points to the lex loci delicti only by way of presuming the
closest connection with the state where both the wrongful act and the injury occurred. This will cover
actions. The draft does not specify which law applies in the rare case in which
the vast majority oftort
neither this nor any other presumption applies, i.e., where wrong and harm occur, theparties reside, and
all other connecting factors are evenly distributed among different states. Under such circumstances,

the court must make the best choice it can under the general principle of the closest connection. All
other things being equal, the judge will probably have to decide between the state of the wrong and the
state of the injury, depending on which of these countries is connected with the case in other ways as
well.
67. The German rules presume this, see supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
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invasion of privacy, unfair competition, and environmental harm, the, closest
connection is presumed to be the place of the harm (Article 4). 61 Second, the
proposal does not allow the plaintiff to choose between the laws of the places of
conduct and of injury. 69 Third, it does not specifically limit the available damages.7"
Finally, like many modem choice-of-law conventions, it excludes renvoi (Article

13).
2. The HagueConvention on Traffic Accidents"'
As its title indicates, the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic
Accidents of 197172 is much more limited in scope than the draft ofthe "Rome II"

convention. It is, however, more important in practice because it has already been
ratified by more than a dozen European countries (though not by Germany).

Its basic rule is that the law ofthe place ofthe accident governs (Article 3); if
at least one of the vehicles involved is registered in the accident state, this choice
is final. If all vehicles are registered elsewhere, the Convention creates several
exceptions in favor of the law of the (common) registration state. While these

exceptions are fairly complicated, they all reflect the same basic idea: registration
state law trumps in situations in which this state normally has the stronger

connection with the case.73 In a sense, registration takes the place ofdomicile as the
primary indicator ofa close connection because it determines the required liability
insurance. The Convention is silent on the parties' right to choose their own law but
such a right is supported by scholarly and judicial authority.74 In sum, lex loci

applies unless it is overridden by a closer connection with the registration state
which in turn can be displaced by party agreement.

Beyond these rules, the Convention resembles the new German tort rules in that
it also favors direct actions against insurers," takes into account the rules ofconduct
68. More specifically, in invasion of privacy, the residence of the plaintiff is presumed to be the
place ofharm; in unfair competition, the affected market is presumed to be the place of harm; and in
environmental torts, place of injury to persons or property is presumed to be the place ofharm.
69. See supra section I.B.I.
70. The type and amount of damages available could still be limited under the general public
policy clause of Art. 14.
71. Generally speaking, Hague conventions are not European because the Hague Conference
consists of members from throughout the world who often accede to its conventions. Yet, the
conventions considered here have in effect been limited to European countries.
72. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Collection ofConventions 142 (1997).
73. Article 4 distinguishes between single- and multi-vehicle accidents. In single car accidents,
the law ofregistration overrides the lex loci with regard to claims by all passenger-victims (i.e., by those
who are part of the vehicle environment) unless they habitually reside in the accident state; with regard
to non-passenger victims (i.e., those who are part of the surroundings), the law of registration trumps
only if they habitually reside in the registration state so that registration and residence point to the same
law. Where two or more vehicles are involved, the law of registration can prevail only if all are
registered in the same state. Similar rules govern claims for property damage under Article 5.
74. See Kegel, supra note 12, at 554 for further references.
75. Article 9 allows a direct action alternatively under the law of the place of the accident, the
law of the registration state, or the law governing the insurance contract.
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prevailing in the accident state (Article 7), and, of course, contains a public policy
escape clause (Article 10). It differs from the German regime in that it excludes
renvoi.76
3. The Hague Convention on ProductsLiability

The last ofour triad, the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products
Liability of 1973, 7 is less important in practice than the agreement covering traffic
accidents. Fewer states have adopted it (Germany not among them), and it is
unlikely that many more will. At least within Europe, the need for unification of
conflicts rules in this area has diminished because of the harmonization of
substantive product liability law.
The Convention contains three complex choice-of-law provisions in Articles
4 through 6. They have been criticized as kaleidoscopic and as deviating too much
from the usual tort conflicts rules."8 While these points are well-taken, one can still
detect the usual pattern in the general approach: it consists ofa residual territorial
rule (with a pro-plaintiff tack) in combination with overrides on several levels
reflecting closer connections with other states. As a basic rule, Article 6 refers to
the law of the defendant's principal place ofbusiness as the likely location of the
wrongful act (design, manufacture, or release of the product into the stream of
commerce) but allows the plaintiff to choose the law of the place of injury if it
occurred in a different state. The first override provision is Article 4 under which
the law ofthe country of injury prevails (mandatorily) if that country has at least
one ofthree other significant contacts with the case.79 Then, in Article 5, the law
of the victim's home state trumps everything else if that state is the most closely
connected jurisdiction, either by virtue ofbeing also the parties' common domicile
or the place where the victim purchased the product.8"
The Convention also contains the usual reference to the rules of conduct and
safety ofthe place ofconduct (Article 9), a public policy exception (Article 10), and
it excludes renvoi.8'

When considering these three conventions together, one is tempted to lament
the lack ofuniformity among them. It is true that more consistency is desirable but
one must not overlook that the major differences lie in the texts' external
organization, in the contacts employed, and in the degree ofspecificity. Their basic

76.
77.
at 192.
78.

The Convention consistently and expressly refers only to the internal law ofthe chosen state.
Hague Conference of Private International Law, Collection ofConventions, supra note 72,
Kegel, supra note 12, at 558.

79. The country must be either the victim's habitual place ofresidence, the defendant's principal
place of business, or the purchase of product by the victim.
80.

Inaddition, Article 7 imposes a general limit: neither the law of the state of injury nor that

ofthe state of the victim's residence may apply if the defendant "could not reasonably have foreseen
that the product or his own products ofthe same type would be made available in that State through
commercial channels."
81. See supra note 76.

1312

2LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 60

message is the same: select the law of the state with the closest connection. More
specifically, their fundamental pattern is almost identical as well: it consists of a
hierarchy of choices in which the lex loci is at the bottom and other (variously
defined) closer connections are layered above it. These fundamental features are
shared not only by most modem European conflicts statutes but also by many
written conflicts rules on the other side ofthe Atlantic.
III. THE TRANSATLANTIC CONTEXT:
INDICATIONS OF AN INTERNATIONAL TREND?

When we look from Europe across the Atlantic, we are facing a situation that
is somewhat different in at least two regards. First, codified choice-of-law rules are
less prevalent although, in addition to the Second Restatement of Conflicts which
presents choice-of-law rules in quasi-codified form, there are some comprehensive
statutes as well as a few interesting drafts. Second, even where Restatement or

statutory rules govern, they usually leave judges more leeway than in Europe.
Many ofthe provisions are drafted in a more open-ended fashion, and at least some
expressly invite policy analysis which tends to be more amorphous and speculative
than looking to concrete contacts. Despite all these differences, there are significant
similarities between the North American (quasi-) codifications and their European
counterparts.
A. The Second Restatement

Despite its lack ofstatutory force, the Second Restatement 2 arguably contains
the most important set of written conflicts rules in the United States today. Its
approach to torts conflicts is by far the most popular among the States with almost
half of them endorsing it.83 Whatever judges do with its fairly'loose provisions in
practice,"4 the Second Restatement is the basic text for a large and growing portion
of American tort conflicts decisions.
At least in personal injury cases, which account for the vast majority of tort

disputes, the Second Restatement's provisions are strikingly similar to the
predominant European approach.

They consist of the familiar mixture of

territorialism and the closest connection principle: the basic rule is to apply the law
of the place of the injury but to override that choice if there is a more significant
relationship with another state (§ 146). The factors that determine whether an
override is warranted are familiar to Europeans as well: the location of conduct and
82. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) (hereafter cited as Restatement 2d).
83. Twenty-one as oflast count, see Symeon Symeonides, ChoiceofLaw in theAmericanCourts
in 1999: One More Year, 48 Am. J.Comp. L. 143, 145-46 (2000).
84. See Patrick Borchers, Courts and the Second Restatement: Some Observations and an
EmpiricalNote, 56 Md. L. Rev. 1232 (1997); Patrick Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An
EmpiricalStudy. 49 Wash. &Lee L Rev. 357, 376-84 (1992); Symeon Symeonides, The Judicial
Acceptance ofthe Second Conflicts Restatement: A Mixed Blessing,56 Md. L. Rev. 1248, 1269-79
(1997).
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harm, the origin (domicile, residence, etc.) of the parties, and the center of the
relationship between them, if any (§ 145 (2)). The major differences are that these
factors are not hierarchically ordered, that the tort rules refer to the vague
considerations listed in § 6 (§ 145 (1)), and that the Restatement encourages an
issue-by-issue approach rather than a wholesale choice (§ 145 (2)).
Like many European conflicts codifications, the Second Restatement is silent
on the question whether the parties to a tort dispute can depart from its rules and
choose their own law by agreement. And like most continental statutes, it contains
special provisions governing particular categories of torts (§§ 147-155, 175-180).
Yet, it also specifically addresses a host of individual issues (§§ 156-174),
reflecting the common law lawyer's obsession with detail.
B. Choice-of-LawStatutes
In 1991, Louisiana codified its choice-of-law regime by amending its Civil
Code,"5 thus becoming the only State of the Union with a full-fledged conflicts
codification. Its basic tort rules share significant characteristics with the European
texts considered above. At first glance, such a statement seems bold." After all,
the lodestar of the new Louisiana regime is the idea of comparative impairment
(Article 3515 (1)), which is virtually unknown in Europe. Yet, this lodestar does
not signify a commitment to California-style interest analysis at all.8 Instead, the
new Louisiana rules contain a healthy dose of territorialism mixed with criteria
reminiscent of the closest connection principle. Like the Second Restatement, it
expressly looks to contacts, especially the place ofconduct and injury, the domiciles
or businesses of the parties, and the center of a relationship between them (Article
3542 (2)). As would be expected, the basic rule for issues of conduct and safety is
to select the law of the place of the tort (Article 3543). But even in matters of loss
distribution, the ground rule is the same: apply the lex loci (Article 3544 (2))."8
This choice is trumped by the law of the parties' common domicile, which in turn
may be displaced in exceptional cases under an escape clause (Article 3547). The
statute has no provision on party autonomy, but it does contain special rules for
products liability (Article 3545) and punitive damages (Article 3546). The
codification's overall approach is more policy oriented than European statutes, but
its hierarchy ofrules and the criteria it employs betray the European training of its
author.
The similarities with Europe are even stronger in the other major conflicts
codification in North America. In Quebec's choice-of-law rules, which entered into

85.
86.

See supra note !.
It is particularly dangerous in a volume dedicated to the scholar who, as their principal

draftsman, is more familiar with the new Louisiana rules than anyone else.
87. See Symeon Symeonides, Louisiana's New Law of Choice ofLawfor Tort Conflicts: An
Exegesis, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 677,691-92 (1992).

88. Ifconduct and injury occur indifferent states, one or the other ispreferred, depending on the
circumstances, see Arts. 3543 (2), (3), 3544 (2).
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force in 1991 as part of its new Civil Code, 9 Article 3126 contains the basic
provisions for torts. Section 1 is the territorial ground rule: normally, the law of
the country in which the "injurious act" takes place applies, though if the harm
foreseeably occurred somewhere else, the law ofthe injury state governs. Section
2 provides the classic exception in favor of the law of the parties' common
domicile. All ofthis is subject to Article 3082, which allows a court to override the
choices in specific cases ifthere is a much closer connection with the law ofanother
country. Like the Louisiana rules, the Quebec Civil Code does not say whether the
parties can select their own law, though there is some indication that this would be
allowed.' It also contains a special rule on products liability in Article 3128.
C. Two Recent Drafts

When we look beyond established rules to some recent drafts, we find similar
9
patterns. The Projetfor the Codification ofPuerto Rican Private International Law '
subscribes to the most-significant-connection principle but also relies heavily on
territorial factors. Tort issues of conduct and safety are normally governed by the
law ofthe state where the conduct occurred (Article 46). Loss distribution between
the parties is determined by the lex loci delictias well92 unless a common domicile
overrides this choice (Article 47). In the last instance, all these rules are subject to
the "general and residual" principle of applying the law ofthe state with the most
significant connection (Articles 2, 45) which is determined by the usual factors.
There is a special provision for products liability (Article 48), but no rule about
party autonomy.
Even the American Law Institute's Draft ofComplex Litigation Rules for Mass
Torts 93 reflects many by-now familiar ideas. It is true that its primary approach is
a form of interest analysis: if the traditional contacts listed in §6.01 (b) show that
only one state's policy would be furthered, that state's law applies (§6.01 (c)). This
would be a so-called "false conflict" and will be very rare in multi-state litigation
involving parties and laws from many states which are likely to have an interest in
seeing their rules applied. In all multi-interest cases, i.e., in the vast majority of
complex tort disputes, the ALI draft also resorts to a mix ofterritorialism and the
significant-relationship approach. Here, it establishes a hierarchy ofchoices. The
primary rule is soundly territorial: if conduct and injury occur in the same state, its

89. Quebec Civil Code (as amended in 1994).
90. The last clause of Article 3082 refers to a choice by party agreement ("through a juridical
act"); since this Article is contained in the General Provisions applying in all specific areas, it is
plausible to infer that the parties are free to choose their own law in torts as well, at least within
reasonable limits.
91. Puerto Rican Academy of Jurisprudence and Legislation, A Projet for the Codification of
Puerto Rican Private International Law (Symeon Symeonides & Arthur T. von Mehren Rapporteurs

1991).
92.

If conduct and injury occurred in different states, this may mean the place ofthe injuryunder

certain conditions defined in Art. 47(b)(2).

93.

A.L.I., Complex Litigation Project (Proposed Final Draft) (May 13, 1993).
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law invariably governs. Otherwise, the common-domicile rule takes over. Where
neither conduct and injury nor the parties' domiciles point to a single state, the
place of the injury or of the conduct provides the law, depending on the
circumstances (§ 6.01 (c) (1)-(4)).9
IV. CONCLUSION
The 1999 German legislation is part of a larger trend in modem choiceof-law codifications, particularly in Europe but also on this side of the
Atlantic. Comparing the German basic principles with other recent conflicts
statutes suggests a growing international consensus. At its core lie three
fundamental rules. First, as a general matter, torts are governed by the law
of the place of the wrong. Second, the lex loci delicti yields to the law of
the state which has a closer relationship to the dispute, normally because it
is the parties' common home state, but sometimes for other reasons such as
a pre-existing relationship. Third, issues of conduct and safety are decided
under, or at least in consideration of, the law of the place where the wrongdoer
acted. To be sure, none of these rules are new or surprising; especially in the
United States, they are rather old hats. What is new is that they now prevail in the
vast majority ofmodem (quasi-) codifications on both sides of the Atlantic as well.
Of course, this does not mean that we are approaching complete uniformity in the
world of tort choice of law. Such a contention is not the point of this brief essay.
It would be particularly inappropriate because my survey was limited in at least
three ways.
First, as indicated by the title, we have considered only codified rules, albeit
in the larger sense, encompassing national, state, or provincial statutes, international
conventions, restatements, and drafts. Yet, vast portions of tort conflicts are
governed by pure caselaw, not only in the common law orbit but in continental
Europe as well. In this caselaw, we find a considerable variety of rules and
approaches, ranging from the solid territorialism of France" and Canada" to the
policy oriented regimes of New York and California. To be sure, many leading

94.

For further analysis and a critique, see Friedrich K. Juenger, The Complex Litigation

Project s Tort Choice-of-Law Rules, 54 La. L. Rev. 907 (1994).

95. The French Cour de cassation has adhered to the lex loci rule since its Latour decision in
1948, Cass. Civ. 25 mai 1948, D. 1948.357 though some lower courts and scholars have differed. For
an overview in English, see Moore, supra note 38, at 52-56. For the attitudes in the lower courts, see
Lagarde, supra note 53, at 103. For scholarship favoring exceptions, see Yvon Loussouarn &Pierre
Bourel, Droit international privd, 457 (marginal number 403) (5th ed. 1996) and, see generally, Pierre
Bourel, Les conflits de lois en matire d'obligations extracontractuelles (Paris 1961). It is noteworthy,
however, that the Cour de cassation's rigid territorialism is tempered by two factors. First, France has

ratified the Hague Conventions on traffic accidents and products liability, both providing for deviations
from the lex loci rule, see supra sections II.B.2. and 3. Second, the parties can choose their own law
after the accident, Cass. Civ. I,Apr. 19, 1988 (affaire Roho), Revue critique de droit international privd
69 note Batiffol (1989).
96. See Tolofson v. Jensen, Lucas v. Gagnon (1995), 100 B.C.L.R. 2d I (S.C.C.).
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cases, especially in the United States, can easily be explained in terms of the three
consensus/rules mentioned above,97 but many cannot.
Second, in looking at written rules, I have emphasized their similarities rather
than their differences. We must not forget the considerable diversity we have found
below the level ofthe elementary principles. Some statutes let the parties pick their
own law while others are silent on this point. Many codifications contain elaborate
rules for specific torts, while others are restricted to general provisions. In defining
the place of the wrong, some look to conduct, others to injury. Several European
regimes let the plaintiff choose between the laws of both, provide for renvoi,and
favor direct actions against insurers, while such idiosyncrasies are by and large
foreign to the American conflicts universe.
Third, we have looked only at part of the world. It is true that Western Europe
and the United States have been the trend setters in shaping private international law
while most other countries have followed, and the pattern noted here is by no means
limited to the North-Atlantic region.98 Still, a more complete picture would have
to take other economically or politically important regions and nations into account.
As the example of China and Japan indicates, it is likely that we would find a fair
degree of variety among their laws."
But even ifwe must be careful not to overstate the case, the recent international
convergence in codified tort conflicts rules is remarkable. It is reason to hope that
at least the routine cases will be treated more and more alike in more and more
countries so that the rewards offorum shopping will be accordingly diminished. As
the increasing mobility of people and goods causes a growing number of
transboundary torts, this is a salutary trend.

97. See Symeonides, supranote 87, at 715 (Louisiana's rules findingsufficientconsensus among
American courts to speak of a"common-domicile rule," i.e., as an exception to lex loci delicti). In fact,
where acourt ignores the basic rules mentioned above in their entirety and applies neither the lex loci
nor the common domicile law, the constitutionality of its choice is open to serious doubt, as Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Hague,449 U.S. 302, 101 S.Ct 633 (1981), illustrates.
98. A casual perusal ofconflicts statutes form other parts of the world shows that many countries
follow the same approach; see the statutes collected in Jan Kropholler et al., Au Bereuroplische IPRGesetze (1999) from Angola, id. 36 at 56-58; Kasachstan, id. 396 at 402; Mongolia, id. 538 at 554;
Mocambique,id. 566 at 590; Tunesia, id. 854 at 902; and Vietnam, id. 1034 at 1044.
99. Art. 146 of the Chinese Common Principles of Civil Law follows the modem trend by
recognizing a common-domicile or common-nationality exception to the territorial groundrule, see
Tung-Pi Chen, PrivateInternationalLaw of the People'sRepublic ofChina,An Overview, 35 Am. J.
Comp. L. 445,469-70 (1987). In contrast, Art. 11 (1) of the Japanese Horei invariably selects the law
of place of the wrong, see Chin Kim, New JapanesePrivateInternationalLaw: The 1990 Horei,40
Am. J. Comp. L. 1,7 (1992).
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APPENDIX
The New German Tort Conflicts Rules '0
Artikel 40
Unerlaubte Handlung

Article 40
Torts

(1) Ansprdiche aus unerlaubter
Handlung unterliegen dem Recht des
Staates, in dem der Ersatzpflichtige
gehandelt hat. Der Verletzte kann
verlagen, daB anstelle dieses Rechts
das Recht des Staates angewandt
wird, in dem der Erfolg eingetreten
ist. Das Bestimmungsrecht kann nur
im ersten Rechtszug bis zum Ende
des fi-ahen ersten Termins oder dem
Ende des schriftlichen Vorverfahrens
ausgeubt werden.'0 '

. (1) Tort claims are subject to the
law of the state in which the liable
party has acted. The injured party
can demand that instead of this law,
the law of the state in which the
injury occurred is applied. The
option can be used only in the first
instance court until the conclusion of
the pre-trial conference or until the
end of the written preliminary
procedure.

(2) Hatten der Ersatzpflichtige
und der Verletzte zur Zeit des
Haftungsereignisses ihren
gew6hnlichen Aufenthalt in
dermselben Staat, so ist das Recht
dieses Staates anzuwenden. Handelt
es sich urn Gesellschaften, Vereine
oder juristische Personen, so steht
demgewthnlichenAufenhalt der Ort
gleich, an dem sich die
Hauptverwaltung oder, wenn eine
Niederlassung beteiligt ist, an dem
sich diese befindet.

(2) If, at the time of the event
underlying the liability, the liable
party and the injured party had their
habitual residences in the same state,
the law of that state applies. In case
of companies, associations, or legal
persons, habitual residence means
the place where the main office, or if
a branch office is involved, that
branch office is located.

(3) Ansprfiche, die dem Recht

(3) Claims governed by the law
ofanother [scil. foreign] state cannot
be made as far as they

eines anderen Staates unterliegen,
ktnnen

nicht

geltend

gemacht

werden, soweit sie

100. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. The translation here is my own.
101. In German civil procedure in the first instance courts, the judge can prepare the main hearing
(Code ofCivil Procedure § 278) in two ways. One is to meet with the parties (or their lawyers) in a pretrial conference in order to discuss the case and to tease out the issues (§ 275). The other is a
preliminary written procedure during which the parties exchange briefs (§ 276).
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1. wesentlich weiter gehen als
zur angemessenen
Entschadigung des
Verletzten erforderlich,
2.

offensichtlich anderen
Zwecken als einer
angeme ssenen
Entschadigung des
Verletzten dienen oder

[Vol. 60

1. go significantly further than
isnecessary for an adequate
compensation ofthe injured
party,
2.

obviously serve purposes
other than an adequate
compensation ofthe injured
party or

3. haftungsrechtlichen
Regelungen eines fur die
Bundesrepublik
Deutschland verbindlichen
Obereinkommens
widersprechen.

3. conflict with liability rules
under a convention in force
in the Federal Republic of
Germany.

Der Verletzte kann seinen
Anspruch unmittelbar
gegen einen Versicherer
des Ersatzpflichtigen
geltend machen, wenn das
auf die unerlaubte
Handlung anzuwendende
Recht oder das Recht, dem
der Versicherungsvertrag
unterliegt, dies vorsieht.

4. The injured party can make
his claim directly against an
insurer ofthe liable party if
that is provided for either
under the law applicable to
the tort or under the law
governing the insurance
contract.

4.

Artikel 41
Wesentlich engere Verbindung

Article 41
Significantly Closer Connection

(1) Besteht mit dem Recht eines
Staates eine wesentlich engere
Verbindung als mit dem Recht, das
nach den Artikeln 38 bis 40 Abs. 2
maBgebend wire, so ist jenes Recht
anzuwenden

(1) If there is a significantly
closer connection with the law of a
state other than the law which
would apply under articles 38
through 40 sec. 2, then that law is
to be applied.

(2) Eine wesentlich engere
Verbindung kann sich insbesondere
ergeben

(2) A significantly closer
connection may result especially
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1. aus einer besonderen
rechtlichen oder
tatsachlichen Beziehung
zwischen den Beteiligten
imZusammenhang mitdem
Schuldverhiltnis oder

1. from a particular legal
or factual relationship
between those

2. [betrifft
nichtdeliktsrechtliche,
auBervertrag-liche
Schuldverhiltnisse]

2.

involved in
connection with the
obligation or
[concerns noncontractual
obligations other than

torts]

Artikel 42
Rechtswahl

Article 42
Choice of Law by the Parties

Nach Eintritt des Ereignisses,
durch das ein auBervertragliches
SchuldverhAltnis entstanden ist,
k6nnen die Parteien das Recht
wAhlen, dem es unterliegen soll.
Rechte Dritter bleiben unberaihrt.

After the occurrence of the
event which gives rise to a noncontractual obligation, the parties
may chose the law by which it shall
be governed. Rights of third parties
remain unaffected.

